Thursday, 5 September 2013

How much worth is our Oil cash ( Published in the Newvision 29th october 2013)

How much worth is our Oil cash

Uganda’s petroleum fiscal regime is a production sharing agreement type with signature bonuses, rentals, royalty, income tax and ring-fence among others.  The fiscal terms applicable to upstream operations are governed by Part IXA of the Income Tax Act, (Cap 340) (ITA), the 2012 Upstream Act) and the terms of any petroleum agreement and. The Ugandan government has, to date, used a production sharing form of petroleum agreement. The principal fiscal terms are as follows:

ü  The government is entitled to a royalty computed as a percentage of gross daily production, such royalty to be in kind or cash at the government’s election. The percentage can be on an escalating scale as production increases. Royalty rates are biddable and will be set out in the licence or petroleum agreement- current information suggests Based on Gross Total daily Production. Where production (P) does not exceed 2,500 5%, 2,500<P<5,000 7.5%, 5,000<P<7,500 10%, and P>7,500 12.5%. Royalty is paid on a monthly basis.

 

ü  Under a production sharing arrangement, the contractor is entitled to cost recovery from a specified percentage of gross oil or gas production after deduction of any applicable royalty. Cost recovery may be ring-fenced with costs only recoverable from production from the contract area to which they relate. After deduction of Royalty, 60% cost recovery limit is allowed. For Purposes of the estimation below, 40% of the Gross revenue (prior to deducting royalties) is assumed.  Unrecovered costs can typically be carried forward;

 

ü  After deduction of royalty and cost recovery, remaining production is split between the government and contractor on a sliding scale as set out in a petroleum agreement, with the government’s percentage increasing as daily production increases. Available information suggests a 67.5% for government and the remaining share for companies;

 

ü  The contractor is required to pay income tax at the standard corporation rate tax of 30 per cent on the proceeds of the sale of their share of profit oil under the petroleum agreement. Contract areas are ring fenced for tax purposes with each contract area taxed as if it is a separate tax payer- this protects loss transfer by companies from one project to another to minimize tax payment;

 

ü  Under the 2012 Upstream Act signature bonuses are payable on the award of exploration and production licences and are not cost recoverable. Signature bonuses have, according to media reports, been paid in respect of petroleum agreements entered into under the repealed Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act (PEPA) regime. It was reported, for example, that the PSAs that were signed on 3 February 2012 by Tullow with CNOOC and Total included a signature bonus of US$500,000 and development bonuses of US$2m;

ü  A licensee must pay an annual charge calculated on the grant of a licence and thereafter annually on the anniversary of the grant until the termination of the licence;

ü  A participation dividend paid by a resident contractor to a non-resident company is liable to a withholding tax at a rate of 15 per cent. A lower rate of withholding tax may apply if the dividend is paid to a resident of a country with whom Uganda has a favourable Double Taxation Agreement. This is indeed a welcome move to mitigate transfer pricing.

ü  Any capital transfer /appreciation/ gains is considered as an income and subjected to 30%.

ü  Thin capitalisation rules- Debt/equity ratio 2:1. Interest is allowed to the extent of the rule.

ü  Excise duty and VAT- Applicable on all procurements subject to the duties.

Despite the aforementioned, Uganda’s fiscal regime provides generous allowable deductions including initial allowances of 75%, decommissioning costs, loss carry forward, tax exemption of machinery and equipment and depreciation allowances.

 

It has been estimated that Uganda has 3.5 billion barrels of oil reserves. Assuming a recovery rate of 50%[1] implies that one billion, seven hundred and fifty thousand barrels of oil will be recovered. At envisaged peak production of 200,000 bpd expected in 2020, then the current deposits would be exhaustible in 24 years earning Uganda 3.6 billion dollars annually[2] based on the calculations in table below.
 Annual Profits In USD- peak procuction 200,000 barrels per day 
  A B=12.5% of A C=40% of A D=A-B-C E=67.5% of D F=32.5% of D G=30% of F H=B+E+G J=H*365
Quantity (A)Total revenues of 200,000 barrels per day @100USD (B) Royalties 12.5% of Total Rev (C) Recovery costs 40% ofgross revenue Profit Oil Government share of tax 67,5% company share 32,5% company share taxed 30% corporate  tax Government profit per day Annual Profit
10000 1 000 000 125 000 400 000 475 000 320 625 154 375 46 313 491 938 179 557 188
20000 2 000 000 250 000 800 000 950 000 641 250 308 750 92 625 983 875 359 114 375
30000 3 000 000 375 000 1 200 000 1 425 000 961 875 463 125 138 938 1 475 813 538 671 563
40000 4 000 000 500 000 1 600 000 1 900 000 1 282 500 617 500 185 250 1 967 750 718 228 750
50000 5 000 000 625 000 2 000 000 2 375 000 1 603 125 771 875 231 563 2 459 688 897 785 938
60000 6 000 000 750 000 2 400 000 2 850 000 1 923 750 926 250 277 875 2 951 625 1 077 343 125
70000 7 000 000 875 000 2 800 000 3 325 000 2 244 375 1 080 625 324 188 3 443 563 1 256 900 313
80000 8 000 000 1 000 000 3 200 000 3 800 000 2 565 000 1 235 000 370 500 3 935 500 1 436 457 500
90000 9 000 000 1 125 000 3 600 000 4 275 000 2 885 625 1 389 375 416 813 4 427 438 1 616 014 688
100000 10 000 000 1 250 000 4 000 000 4 750 000 3 206 250 1 543 750 463 125 4 919 375 1 795 571 875
150000 15 000 000 1 875 000 6 000 000 7 125 000 4 809 375 2 315 625 694 688 7 379 063 2 693 357 813
200000 20 000 000 2 500 000 8 000 000 9 500 000 6 412 500 3 087 500 926 250 9 838 750 3 591 143 750
According to available information, Government will charge Royalties of 5% if production capacity is less than 2500 bpd, 7.5% if production is between 2500 bpd and 5000 bpd, 10% if production is between 7500 bpd and 10,000 bpd, and 12.5% for all quantities above 10,000 bpd. After deducting royalties, the oil companies are supposed to deduct their recoverable costs(40% of gross revenue) to obtain profit oil.  The profit oil is then shared between the government (67.5%) and the oil companies (32.5%) respectively. 
Calculation by Enock Twinoburyo
 

 

Oil revenues over the 24 years at peak production of 200,000 bpd, would earn Uganda about 84bn dollars revenue. With a population of 35 million, the latter means $2,400 per capita, or more than 4.5 times GDP per capita at market prices. Thus, the value of the discovered oil is large but far from being large enough to itself lead to a revolutionary change in the living conditions of the average Ugandan. The oil will not make the average Ugandan a rich oil sheik but if the oil re- source is wisely spent, it certainly may make a difference.

 
An assumption can however be made and calculations made for different types of fiscal rules ( suggested saving thresholds for givernment) i.e. Bird in hand or Permanent income hypothesis rule.  To the done at later stage


It is also important- to take stock of how much Uganda has earned so far. Oil in Uganda (www.oilinuganda) estimates that Uganda has got close to 1 billion USD (UGX 2.6 Trillon- which is about 20% of the current Budget of UGX 13.6 trillion). Tullow Transferred two thirds of its rights worth USD 2.9billion ( a third each) to Total and CNOOC. Government levied a capital gains tax of 472.7m in capital gains and Tullow only paid a third of it (USD 141 Million). Tullow is expcted to pay full amount after a London arbitration hearing found that heritage should have paid full amount of capital gains.  According to Bank of Uganda- Uganda has so far received USD 620 Million and should expect another USD 286 Million the balance on capital gains of Tullow’s farm down to CNOOC and Total.  According to Tullow published reports about USD 32 million has been paid in other fees and taxes last year, assuming the same payments by Total and CNOOC would mean Uganda has so far received USD 720 milloon and expects USD 286 Million. It is a fair assumption that Uganda is USD 1 Bn Rich todate or more bearing in mind Uganda presumably has earned some cash from the eight years of oil exploration before 2012.



[1] With improved and enhance recovery methods, Norway managed to increase recovery rate from 25% to 45% offshore. Recovery rate can even increase to 60% with the use of modern and efficient technologies.
[2] Without clear fiscal rules on how the government will share revenue between the budget and investment, Fiscal sustainability analysis has not been calculated due to missing information. An assumption can however be made and calculations made for different types of fiscal rules i.e. Bird in hand or Permanent income hypothesis rule. To the done at later stage

Tuesday, 3 September 2013

Chinalisation of Uganda is a boomerang ( published in observer) link attached

Economic ties between China and Africa have grown steadily as reflected in the growing/ increasing aid to Africa in recent years. In the latest official disclosure of China’s aid indicated that it had provided over 6 Billion USD to Africa; however the most official aid considered a state secret.
China and Uganda diplomatic relations date as far back as to when Uganda attained its independence in 1962 and according data released by the American research group AidData, in the decade between 2000 and 2011 China’s aid to Uganda was an enormous $4.67b, slightly more than Uganda’s budget for this financial year.It is envisaged that as much as the subsequent years are not documented, the dialogue between the two countries is an indicator that there is continued aid increase. The aid china provides is mainly in the form of technical assistance, with an emphasis on training in Chinese institutions; grants; interest-free loans; preferential loans that have an interest subsidy; and debt relief. In 2007, a debt cancellation protocol for all debts before 2005 was signed by the two heads of state, which amounted to USD 30 million.  However, since China is not a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which reports on members' international aid, it does not provide details about the level and terms of its own aid to other countries—so data and information with regard to types, purposes, conditions, including the extent to which is assistance is tied are rather sketchy.
 
The sectors which have greatly benefited are transport; business related services, manufacturing, health and agriculture whereas telecommunications, mineral exploration has not realized the benefits from the eternal assistance extended by China to Uganda. Government officials reported that some of the aid to Uganda is mostly provided in kind, by Chinese companies, and tends to be on a turnkey basis, mostly with Chinese inputs, including labour. Part of Chinese Aid to the country has taken the form of technical assistance and investment technical assistance in projects of economic and social infrastructure nature such as roads and hospitals; the productive sector, notably agriculture (Kibimba (now Tilda) and Doha rice schemes);construction of the wakawaka Fish landing site now in use and other construction projects, such as government buildings (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the $36.3m  construction of the President’s Office), Naguru Hospital and sports national  stadium (Mandela National Stadium).  China has been offering 12 scholarships per year in higher education to Ugandans in mainly five fields engineering, computer science, Medicine, Business administration and food science. China has contributed medical equipment, and medicine to national referral hospital – the anti malaria medicine worth USD 500,000 per annum through Ministry of health.
 
President Museveni has been singing China’s praises his optimism a beam of light when he discusses the long term impact of Chinese investment in Ugandan infrastructure. Chinese continue to be beneficiaries of big infrastructural projects including the contentiously awarded Karuma dam (600MW) and the 51.4km Kampala- Entebbe high way. In president’s speech at the ground breaking for Karuma dam- he intimated that two other Chinese companies, Gezhouba and CWE (China International Water and Electric Corporation) will similarly take on Ayago and Isimba, according to the understanding Uganda reached with the Chinese side.   CNOOC is one of the 3 firms involved in oil exploration in Uganda. Chinese investment in the country is currently worth $596m creating employment opportunities for more than 30,000 Ugandans. In fact, there is fundamentally no sector in Uganda that the Chinese have not invested in or have future plans to invest in. The Chinese are planning to construct a multi-million dollar school that would teach Chinese to local students, in order to broaden trade and cultural ties between the two countries.
 
 China and Uganda trade relations date as far back in the 1960s. China is one of Uganda’s main trading partners. In 2012, 11% of the total imports were from China. In same year, the trade volume between the two countries came to US$575.5 million, among which China's export was US$546.01 million, and import US$29.49 million. This implies Uganda exports 5% of what it imports from China. China's main exports to Uganda are mechanical and electrical appliances, textiles, garments, pharmaceuticals, porcelain and enamel products, and footwear. China's imports from Uganda are coffee and plastics. China strategy is to phase in zero-tariff treatment to 95 percent of the products from the least developed African countries( Uganda inclusive) having diplomatic relations with China, starting with 60 percent of the products in 2010.
 
The president’s eulogy’s of the Chinese withstanding “Chinese lending is also completely free of the usual meddling and high-handedness of some of the friends from outside”, it is also important to note that despite the huge funds sunk in the Uganda sectors and written off debts by china, there still concerns over the huge trade imbalances between Uganda and China. Uganda exports 5% volume of what it imports from China. Also in 2008, china provided USD 120 million concessionary loan to Government’s e government project however the dominant workforce is Chinese. This leaves little room for capacity building, skills training and technology transfer.  Most of china’s Aid is project mode, whose sustainability depends heavily on continuous support from the Chinese Government. Limitation of the technology and skills transfer by Chinese Government leads to questions of sustainability of some of its development assistance. Aid flows from China are not laid out transparently to other donors and development partners, including those that are locally present. This will help not only the affect harmonization of activities but also the integration with economic policies to underpin macroeconomic stability.
 
On the outlook, it seems that the Chinese infrastructure projects in Uganda attract higher unit costs than similar projects in other countries.  The Renaissance dam on the River Nile, which Addis Ababa projects will cost $4.7 billion, will produce 6,000 Megawatts of power(10 times Karuma dam) when fully developed while karuma is projected to cost $2.2billion. Also the cost per kilometre of the  $ 476m four lane Kampala- Entebbe expressway is  $ 1.5m, a kilometre of the six lane  $ 612m Addis Ababa toll motor way will cost 1.3m. All factors constant, on both projects- Uganda will be paying higher than Ethiopia
 
Most of Chinese aid is tied – with at times necessitating Uganda to import from China. Notably significant share of Chinese export to Uganda are substandard. the Ugandan government allows the Chinese Aliens to undercut local Ugandans out of business and allows Chinese capital repatriation to be almost 100%  and at times given tax waivers or exemptions. Issa Sekito, a spokesman for the Kampala City Traders Association has been on record calling for government to place limits on Chinese trading activities in the small and medium enterprise area.
 
There are allegedly also elements of rent-seeking activities between Ugandan and Chinese officials as was the case in Karuma dam procurement. The hydro power dam procurement process was dogged by allegations of impropriety and whistle-blowers’ complaints that culminated in court petitions and the Inspectorate Government (IGG) halting the process citing bribery and corruption in the process. A court injunction halted the process ordering the government to repeat the technical evaluation which led to award of the to a China’s Sinohydro Corporation. The procurement flaws delayed the project for two and half years. Also Chinese companies are able to underbid local contractors for construction work since Chinese construction companies that are subsidized by their government. And it is difficult to get a government subsidy in Uganda. “They not only underbid local companies, but they also import cheap Chinese equipment. So construction companies in Uganda have gone out of business.
 
Although the Chinese have made significant investments in Uganda and continue to make inroads in major infrastructure projects involving roads, railway electrical power and communications, the Ugandan government has not benefited greatly from increased trade with China. The Chinese engagements could be a boomerang and this however,  leaves a hypothetical question on who the beneficiary from the  increased china-lisation of Uganda and needs a closer assessment of the ultimate outcomebearing in mind  the Chinese have historically been xenophobic.  How does China stand to gain from this collaboration? Is it through market creation? Global leadership? Imperialist rivalry? etc especially when many Chinese, in rural China, still live under difficult circumstances.
 
 
 
 

Wednesday, 21 August 2013

Oil and Natural Resource Governance lessons for Uganda

  Oil and Natural Resource Governance lessons for Uganda (http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=7436&magazine=455)
 On 11th August 2013, spending 12 hours enroute from Uganda to Accra, Ghana, notwithstanding, I was particularly impressed by the Services of the Rwanda Airline. In my hands was the Rwanda Air magazine which contained articles that project the good lessons about Rwanda and indeed having a national airline is one of the most effective conduits to marketing a country. Rwanda airline I learnt through this magazine now flies to about 17 destinations. This article however is not about the Rwanda lessons for Uganda, but key lessons from the two weeks Revenue Watch Institute training on “Governance of oil, Gas and Mining Revenues” that I have participated in. The objectives of the training were to empower the participants with requisite knowledge and skills to enable them undertake independent analysis of fiscal and management policies, transparency and contracts analysis, and also to help them understand key legislation issues in natural resource dependent countries. It is against this background I have shared key governance issues   in Uganda and the citizens’ engagement for reforms at large.

Enshrined in literature is the fact that absence of good Governance tends to lead    to resource curse. Examples can be seen in cases of Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea.  Good governance is a broad term that   encompasses a set of factors that affect decision-making on public resource management; that is policies, institutions, legislation, democracy, state capacity, civil society, independence of institutions and corporate governance. It is evidenced also that most rich economies countries in African that have low rating in Transparency International corruption perception index are arguably the resource cursed; the case of transparency missing where it is needed most.

Ghana is yet to realize full benefits of the oil production. Having discovered commercial viable oil in 2007 and started production in November 2010, Ghana is already implementing transparency initiatives like the Dodd frank Wall Street reform and consumer protection act which was signed in 2010, the European Union Directive and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative membership-EITI (where companies are required to publish what they pay to governments and governments publish what they receive from companies). Ghana has since produced nine reports covering 2004-2011 after signing to EITI in 2003 with the last report covering the oil and gas sector among other minerals, forestry and Fisheries. The Ghana EITI’s reports have already informed policy and institutional reforms including the review of fiscal regime in mining industry and development of guidelines for the utilisation of minerals royalties at the sub national level.

There are allegations that Uganda could be committing strategic transparency mistakes at the nascent stages of oil development. The oil debate in Uganda has been marred by rumours and a lack of clear information. This has been the case particularly in relation to the Production-Sharing Agreements (PSAs) signed by the government, and associated allegations of bribery. The Ugandan government has, to date, released partial details of the agreements to parliament, but has refused to disclose them to the public. The resulting controversy has been divisive and perhaps even unnecessary. It may well be the case that the agreements have been well negotiated, as attested by independent auditors who have examined them. The fact that they nevertheless remain the centre of speculation and argument underlines the risks of information being controlled too closely.


Uganda has also in principle committed itself to Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative membership (where companies are required to publish what they pay to governments and governments publish what they receive from companies), but has not yet taken the necessary steps for inclusion.Uganda has two laws on oil and gas already: the Petroleum (exploration, development and production) Act 2012 and the mid stream act and  is yet to pass the Public finance bill( which includes oil revenue management). The contention of the ministerial super powers in petroleum act notwithstanding, it is critical that mandates of the various institutions are clarified in the regulations of the respective laws and that these regulations are expedited. Ghana for example has an Oil Revenue Management Act now two years running but the regulations are yet been developed. Regulations are basically rules of operationalisng the law.

Though Uganda has legally recognized the right of citizens to access information held by government, enshrined in the Access to Information Act (2005), this has not been fully operationalized, and is in any case contradicted by the provisions for confidentiality of information envisaged in new oil-related legislation.

The public finance bill which is yet to be submitted for second parliamentary reading does not envisage the creation of a future savings fund, or even the stipulation of a formal fiscal rule laying down in law the percentage of revenues to be invested. Instead, the division of funds between the regular budget and the Petroleum Investment Reserve will be decided on a year-by-year basis by the minister and parliament. There is a clear risk that political pressures will result in revenues being spent rather than invested. The last three years of increased spending, high supplementary budgets, high inflation and debate on the independence of parliament from the executive illustrate this point. Paul collier in 2011 at the Joseph Mubiru Memorial lecture makes a case that before revenues flow, prudent management requires establishing how much public spending should increase and how much to increase. Uganda should in its laws explicitly define clearly the allocation rules of oil funds to the budget. One option could be defining a limit on total, primary, or current spending, either in absolute terms, growth rates, or in percent of GDP. Examples:  Botswana rule – ceiling on the expenditure-to-GDP ratio of 40 percent. The other option is the imposition of ceilings on overall revenues or revenues from oil and gas entering the budget.   Ghana law creates that 70% of the annual net oil revenue is allocated to the budget and the remaining 30% is allocated to the heritage fund (future savings fund) and stabilisation fund (for contingency purposes incase of fluctuations). Ghana’s royalty bill is now in parliament for discussion.
The Revenue watch institute assessment of public finance bill and the proposed amendments notes that the current public finance bill proposal is for the Petroleum Fund to be managed by the Ministry of Finance, with operational management delegated to the Bank of Uganda. The Bank of Uganda may appoint an external manager. Financial reports are subject to Auditor-General oversight and Parliament. However, compared to the Chilean, Ghanaian, Timor-Leste or Sao Tome and Principe revenue management legislation, and compared to Norway’s fund management regulatory regime, the Ugandan bill lacks managerial details and independent oversight. The Ugandan legislation could enhanced to include; Independent external audits that meet international standards and are publicly available, an independent supervisory committee that reports publicly on the use of petroleum revenues and compliance with rules, as in Norway  and  an independent oversight body consisting of civil society representatives that reports publicly on the use of petroleum revenues and compliance with rules, as in Ghana.

The public finance bill and other related laws define Uganda’s fiscal regime and is blend of income tax (30%), production sharing agreements with the government, bonuses, surface fees and royalty (5% to 12.5%) based taxation. The future revenues generated will depend on how effectively hedge against companies’ innovative techniques through thin capitalisation, transfer pricing, accelerated depreciation, discounting of recovery costs. Ring fencing would also be an ideal policy response- ensuring that each individual mining project is taxed independently. The aforementioned innovative techniques are avenues of collusion by responsible government bodies and companies and thus require vigilant oversight by competent bodies.

 The mandate of the oil companies (NATOIL)   is not well grounded in the petroleum (exploration, and development Act 2012. The current version of the PRM chapter does not include provisions covering the financial flows between NATOIL and the state. It is critical that this relationship be clarified. There are good examples of national oil companies like the Norwegian Statoil- which is almost a purely commercial body. At the same time, there are also bad cases of national companies especially when there is political interference, when the mandate is not clear, missing rules, and weak oversight of the national companies. The State Mining Corporation (STAMICO) in Tanzania which is entirely govern­ment-owned has been largely inactive in recent years, but the government hopes to revitalize it in order to manage joint ventures with private companies. So far, STAMICO has only tak­en part in one joint venture and no information is available on future operations. The company is audited annually, but does not publish reports on its operations or revenues.
In a nutshell the best safe guards are not in the law but rather the informed citizen and the real source of the curse is not natural resources but rather the economic and political mismanagement. There is need to develop impeccable agencies for routine surveillance and monitoring like in Botswana and Norway. Transparency in public affairs coupled with effective media scrutiny would go a long away in the illegal rent seekers or corruption and the associated capital flight. Transparency is the cornerstone of Intergenerational planning by not depleting our reserves today without compromising the benefits of the future.There is also need to manage expectations as well creating effective conduits of informing citizens on the regular development activities in the oil sector.

The governance lessons withstanding which is the scope of this article, Uganda should also make a concerted effort to manage the expected windfall economic consequences of economy overheating by investing in enhancing agricultural productivity, use public policies to reduce cost of investment, increase efficiency in public spending, connect to coast, developing local content policies(beyond the oil sector), implement the environmental safe guards or environment assessment recommendations as well strategies to engage local communities. The Ghana Public accounts committee has already held public consultations in the oil producing Western region of the country, an important step in ensuring local voices and concerns are adequately represented in the national debate.

  




banking sector sound but shallow